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Quad9

rezolvitor DNS recursiv public global cu sediul în Elveția
Quad9
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FondatorIBM[1]
Packet Clearing House[*][[Packet Clearing House (International organization maintaining the domain name system and Internet exchange points)|​]][1]
Global Cyber Alliance[*][[Global Cyber Alliance (nonprofit organisation dedicated in computer security)|​]][1]  Modificați la Wikidata
SediuZürich, Werdstrasse[*][[Werdstrasse (street in the city of Zürich, Switzerland)|​]], 2
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Quad9 este un rezolvitor DNS recursiv public global care își propune să protejeze utilizatorii de programele malware și phishing. Quad9 este operat de Fundația Quad9, o organizație non-profit cu sediul în Zürich, Elveția, care are ca scop îmbunătățirea confidențialității și securității cibernetice a utilizatorilor de internet. Quad9 se supune legislației elvețiene privind confidențialitatea, iar guvernul elvețian extinde această protecție a legii la utilizatorii Quad9 din întreaga lume, indiferent de cetățenie sau de țara de reședință.[2]

Securitate și confidențialitate

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Mai multe evaluări independente au arătat că Quad9 este extrem de eficient (aproximativ 97%) în blocarea domeniilor asociate cu malware și phishing.[3][4][5] În iunie 2021, Quad9 a raportat blocarea a peste 100 de milioane de infecții malware și atacuri de phishing pe zi.[6] Filtrarea malware-ului prin Quad9 este o opțiune selectabilă de către utilizatori. Domeniile care sunt filtrate nu sunt stabilite direct de Quad9, ci sunt furnizate de o varietate de analiști independenți de informații despre amenințări, utilizând metodologii diferite. Quad9 utilizează un sistem de evaluare a reputației pentru a agrega aceste surse și elimină domeniile „fals pozitive” din lista de filtre, dar nu adaugă direct domenii în lista de filtre.[3][7][8][9]

Quad9 a fost printre primele servicii care au utilizat criptografia puternică pentru a proteja confidențialitatea interogărilor DNS ale utilizatorilor și a fost, de asemenea, unul dintre primele servicii care au implementat validarea criptografică DNSSEC⁠(d) pentru a proteja utilizatorii de deturnarea numelui de domeniu.[10][11][12][13][14] Quad9 protejează confidențialitatea utilizatorilor prin faptul că nu reține sau prelucrează adresele IP ale acestora, conformându-se astfel Regulamentului General pentru Protecția Datelor (GDPR).[15][16][17]

Locații

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Harta locațiilor de rezoluție recursive Quad9 din 2021-05-27

În august 2021, Quad9 funcționa din grupuri de servere în 224 de locații pe șase continente și în 106 țări.[18]

Cazul juridic cu Sony Music

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La 18 iunie 2021, Quad9 a fost notificată cu privire la un ordin judecătoresc emis de Tribunalul Districtual din Hamburg, prin care Sony Music a cerut Quad9 să blocheze rezoluția DNS a unui nume de domeniu utilizat de un site web care nu conținea materiale ce încălcau drepturile de autor, dar care conținea linkuri către alte site-uri ce le încalcă.[19] Acesta a fost primul caz în care industria deținătoare de drepturi de autor a încercat să oblige un operator DNS recursiv să blocheze accesul la nume de domenii de internet, stabilind un precedent potențial cu consecințe semnificative. Directorul general al Quad9, John Todd, a fost citat în presă afirmând: „Donatorii noștri ne sprijină pentru a proteja publicul de amenințările cibernetice, nu pentru a îmbogăți Sony” și a avertizat că, dacă acest precedent se confirmă, ar putea duce la acțiuni similare împotriva altor părți terțe neimplicate, cum ar fi programele antivirus, browserele web, sistemele de operare și firewall-urile. Expertul juridic Thomas Rickert de la asociația germană de internet, eco⁠(d), a comentat că „nu-mi pot imagina un furnizor care să fie mai puțin responsabil pentru domeniile ilegale decât un operator de rezolvitor DNS public.” Quad9 a anunțat imediat că va contesta interdicția și, pe 24 iunie, a confirmat că a angajat un avocat german pentru a depune o obiecție la interdicție.[20][21][9][22][23][24][25][26][27]

La 31 august 2021, Quad9 a depus o obiecție la ordinul de încetare, invocând o serie de deficiențe în argumentele juridice prezentate de Sony, bazându-se în principal pe faptul că furnizorii de servicii de internet (ISP-uri), care au relații de afaceri cu părțile care încalcă legea, sunt scutiți de răspunderea față de terți, chiar dacă operează, de asemenea, rezolvitoare recursive DNS. Quad9 a argumentat că este o interpretare greșită a legii să excludă rezolvitoarele recursive independente de această scutire.[28][29][30][31]

Pe 5 decembrie 2023, procesul a fost respins, iar Sony a fost obligată să plătească costurile litigiului. Deși instanța a pronunțat verdictul ca fiind definitiv, fără posibilitate de apel, Sony poate face apel la închiderea apelului printr-o plângere împotriva refuzului de acordare a permisiunii de apel, urmată de un apel la cauza în sine la Curtea Federală Germană.[32]

Serviciu

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Quad9 operează servere de nume recursive pentru uz public la cele douăsprezece adrese IP enumerate mai jos. Aceste adrese sunt direcționate către cel mai apropiat server operațional utilizând rutarea Anycast⁠(d). Quad9 acceptă DNS over TLS prin portul 853,[33] DNS over HTTPS prin portul 443,[34] și DNSCrypt⁠(d) prin portul 8443.[35]

Note

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  1. ^ a b c https://www.quad9.net/about/sponsors, accesat în   Lipsește sau este vid: |title= (ajutor)
  2. ^ Steiger, Martin (). „Quad9 Foundation – Recursive DNS Resolver in Switzerland / Applicability of Swiss and European Data Protection Law” (PDF). steigerlegal.ch. Steiger Legal. Arhivat din original (PDF) la . Accesat în . Quad9 is entirely and fully subject to Swiss data protection law including the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP) and its corresponding ordinance with regard to all data subjects, i.e., for all persons worldwide whose data is being processed by Quad9. Compliance with Swiss data protection law is subject to the independent supervision of the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC). Data subjects may file a complaint with the FDPIC regardless of their citizenship or country of residence. 
  3. ^ a b Reda, Julia (). „Quad9 in Störerhaftung – neue Rechtsunsicherheit für DNS-Resolver”. Heise Online. Accesat în . Quad9 service is characterized by significantly increasing IT security compared to alternative, mostly commercial DNS services. Independent tests have determined that Quad9 filters over 97 percent of tested malware and phishing domains. 
  4. ^ Young, Andrew (). „Comparing Malware-blocking DNS Resolvers”. andryou.com. Andryou. Arhivat din original la . Accesat în . Quad9: 97.08% effective, Cloudflare: 56.20% effective, OpenDNS: 2.19% effective 
  5. ^ Kod, Skadlig (). „Malicious Site Filters on DNS”. skadligkod.se. Skadlig Kod. Accesat în . Quad9: 96% effective, Cloudflare: 13% effective, OpenDNS: 46% effective 
  6. ^ „Quad9: Witnesses Extensive Growth in Blocked DNS Strength”. EaDnsKeep. . Arhivat din original la . Accesat în . Quad9 is currently seeing a new record-setting rate of approximately 60 million of these blocking events per day, representing a 600% year-over-year growth rate. During heavy “storms” of cybercrime venture, this volume has increased to over 100M events per day. 
  7. ^ „Quad9 Partners”. Accesat în . Quad9 partners with a large number of threat intelligence sources who provide up-to-the-minute data about domains that pose a threat because of malware, phishing, botnets, or other malicious activities. Quad9 uses vetted open-source threat data as well as donated information from commercial sources. 
  8. ^ Schmitt, Paul; Edmundson, Anne; Mankin, Allison; Feamster, Nick (). „Oblivious DNS: Practical Privacy for DNS Queries”. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. 2019 (2): 228–244. doi:10.2478/popets-2019-0028. Arhivat din original la . Accesat în . Quad9 provides both security and privacy features for DNS. Quad9 uses threat intelligence data at the recursive resolver to prevent a client from accessing a malicious site. This recursive resolver does not store or distribute the DNS data passing through. 
  9. ^ a b Jackson, Mark (). „DNS Providers May Be Forced to Block Internet Piracy Websites”. ISPreview. Accesat în . The court also seemed to accept Sony’s argument that Quad9 already blocks problematic websites (e.g. those that contain malware – viruses, spyware etc.), despite that being a very different consideration. Quad9’s General Manager, John Todd, said: 'Quad9 derives its threat intelligence from qualified experts on malware and phishing, not from the claims of parties without relevant expertise. We would be unable to maintain our 98% success rate in blocking cyber-threats if we accepted input based on self-interested claims, rather than on forensics and expert analysis.' we could imagine that many more Rights Holders may rush to make use of this for similar websites. Naturally, Quad9 intends to appeal and so the battle is not yet over. 
  10. ^ „New "Quad9" DNS service blocks malicious domains for everyone”. Ars Technica. . Accesat în . 
  11. ^ Bortzmeyer, Stéphane (). „Quad9, a Public DNS Resolver - with Security”. labs.ripe.net. RIPE Labs. Accesat în . Last week, the new DNS resolver Quad9 has been announced. It is a public DNS resolver with the additional benefit that it is accessible in a secure way. There are other public DNS resolvers, but the link to them is not secure. This allows hijackings as well as third-party monitoring. The new Quad9 service on the other hand is operated by the not-for-profit Packet Clearing House (PCH), which manages large parts of the DNS infrastructure, and it allows access to the DNS over TLS. This makes it very difficult for third parties to listen in. And it makes it possible to authenticate the resolver. 
  12. ^ Woodcock, Bill (). „Statement by Bill Woodcock, chairman of Quad9's board”. Reddit. Accesat în . 
  13. ^ Dickinson, Sara (). „DNS Privacy Public Resolvers”. DNS Privacy Project. Accesat în . 
  14. ^ Schmitt, Paul; Edmundson, Anne; Mankin, Allison; Feamster, Nick (). „Oblivious DNS: Practical Privacy for DNS Queries”. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. 2019 (2): 228–244. doi:10.2478/popets-2019-0028. Arhivat din original la . Accesat în . Quad9 provides both security and privacy features for DNS. Quad9 uses threat intelligence data at the recursive resolver to prevent a client from accessing a malicious site. This recursive resolver does not store or distribute the DNS data passing through. 
  15. ^ „Quad9 Data and Privacy Policy”. Quad9. Accesat în . The Reply To Address is purged from RAM as soon as we have transmitted the reply to the user's Reply To Address. The Reply To Address (or any representation of, or proxy for, it) is not copied to permanent storage, nor is it transmitted across the network to any destination other than the user. It leaves the machine on which we received it only in the form of a reply to the user – to no other destination, in no other form, for no other purpose. 
  16. ^ „A Deeper Dive Into Public DNS Resolver Quad9”. Internet Society. Accesat în . 
  17. ^ Brennan, Jim (). „New Quad9 DNS Service Makes the Internet Safer and More Private”. securityintelligence.com. Security Intelligence. Accesat în . Quad9 goes far beyond standard DNS name resolution. Unlike many other DNS services, Quad9 does not store, correlate or otherwise employ any personally identifiable information (PII). 
  18. ^ „Internet Exchange Directory | PCH”. www.pch.net. Accesat în . 
  19. ^ Huston, Geoff (). „Opinion: DNS4EU”. APNIC. Sony Music Germany bought a suit against the DNS open resolver provider Quad9 in a German court. The court ruled that Quad9 must block the resolution of a domain name of a website in Ukraine that itself does not hold copyright-infringing material, but instead contains pointers to another website that is reported to hold alleged copyright infringements. Quad9’s interpretation of this ruling is that queries received from IP addresses that can be geolocated to Germany must generate a SERVFAIL response from Quad9’s recursive resolvers. 
  20. ^ Van der Sar, Ernesto (). „Sony Wins Pirate Site Blocking Order Against DNS-Resolver Quad9”. TorrentFreak. Accesat în . Sony Music has obtained an injunction that requires the freely available DNS-resolver Quad9 to block a popular pirate site. The order, issued by the District Court in Hamburg, Germany, is the first of its kind. The Quad9 foundation has already announced that it will protest the judgment, which could have far-reaching consequences. The Hamburg court found that the DNS service is not eligible for the liability protections that other third-party intermediaries such as ISPs and domain registrars typically enjoy. And if Quad9 fails to comply with the injunction, it will have to pay a fine of 250,000 euros per ‘infringing’ DNS query plus potentially two years in prison. 
  21. ^ Ermert, Monika (). „Copyright infringement: Sony obtains injunction against DNS resolvers”. Heise Online. Accesat în . Sony wants to ban the DNS resolution of domains by injunction. The district court in Hamburg ruled that Quad9 was not covered by the usual liability privileges for pure intermediaries like an Internet service provider or even domain registrars. 
  22. ^ Grüner, Sebastian (). „Sony will DNS-Sperre bei Quad9 durchsetzen”. Golem. Accesat în . The DNS provider Quad9, which is now officially located in Switzerland, is held liable as a "Stoerer" (interferer) in this case, because the DNS resolution of the service enables copyright infringement. The "Stoererhaftung" (Breach of Duty of Care), its effects on copyright law, and any associated warnings against private individuals or even companies have been a point of contention in the law-making process of politics and the judiciary for decades. What is surprising about the current case is that Internet providers and registrars are actually exempt from "Stoererhaftung" (Breach of Duty of Care) under the so-called provider privilege. However, the Hamburg Regional Court apparently sees things differently. 
  23. ^ „Sony zieht gegen Schweizer NPO Quad9 vor Gericht”. IT-MARKT. . Accesat în . Sony has obtained an injunction from the district court of Hamburg against Quad9, a non-profit organization (NPO) recently based in Switzerland. … Not Quad9's size, but the fact that Quad9 is the only major DNS resolver no longer based in the US prompted Sony to obtain the injunction, Woodcock says to the news portal. (translation from German) 
  24. ^ King, Ashley (). „Sony Music Wins Injunction Requiring DNS Resolver to Block Pirate Site”. Digital Music News. Accesat în . Sony Music has won an injunction requiring a DNS resolver to block a popular piracy site. The ruling is the first of its kind and may signal a new direction in tackling music piracy. The order was issued by the District Court in Hamburg, Germany. The Hamburg Court ruling finds that DNS resolvers like Quad9 are not eligible for liability protections like ISPs and domain registrars. If Quad9 fails to block the infringing site, it faces a fine of up to $298,356.00 (€250,000) per infringing DNS query it processes and a potential prison stint of up to two years. 
  25. ^ „Quad9 and Sony Music: German Injunction Status”. Quad9. . Arhivat din original la . Accesat în . Quad9 was notified last Friday that Sony Music had obtained an injunction against Quad9 in the lower court of Hamburg, Germany, seeking to block DNS resolution of domains used to host music content files on the grounds that such resolution contributes to infringement upon Sony’s copyrights. Quad9 has no relationship with any of the parties to the alleged infringement. Our systems resolve domain names, conveying public information on the public Internet, as any other recursive resolver would do, and there is no allegation that the domain names themselves, or any information that Quad9 has handled, infringe upon Sony’s copyrights. We have retained counsel, and we are in the process of filing an objection to the injunction. 
  26. ^ „Beschluss In der Sache Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH gegen Quad9 Stiftung” (PDF). Landgericht Hamburg. . Arhivat din original (PDF) la . Accesat în . 
  27. ^ „Resolution in the case Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH versus Quad9 Foundation” (PDF). Hamburg Lower Court. . Arhivat din original (PDF) la . Accesat în . By way of interim injunction - for reasons of urgency without oral proceedings - the defendant is ordered to avoid a Tine to be determined by the court for each case of culpable infringement and, in the event that this cannot be recovered, to serve a term of imprisonment of up to six months (fine in individual cases not exceeding 250,000.00, imprisonment for a total of not more than two years) prohibited to enable third parties in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany the music album "Evanescence – The Bitter Truth" to be made publicly available. 
  28. ^ Ermert, Monika (). „Sony vs. Quad9: a wave of donations for the DNS resolver”. Heise Online. Accesat în . 
  29. ^ Stegeman, Koen (). „Quad9 Files Appeal Against Copyright Lawsuit from Sony Music Germany”. Hosting Journalist. Accesat în . 
  30. ^ Reda, Julia (). „Quad9 in Störerhaftung – neue Rechtsunsicherheit für DNS-Resolver”. Heise Online. Accesat în . Quad9 service is characterized by significantly increasing IT security compared to alternative, mostly commercial DNS services. Independent tests have determined that Quad9 filters over 97 percent of tested malware and phishing domains. 
  31. ^ Carnesi, Ken (). „DNSFilter CEO Responds to Quad9 Injunction: "DNS resolvers should not police the Internet for copyright violations"”. DNSfilter. Accesat în . 
  32. ^ „Sony zieht gegen Schweizer NPO Quad9 vor Gericht” (PDF). Higher Regional Court Dresden. . Accesat în . On appeal by the defendant, the judgment of the Regional Court of Leipzig dated March 1, 2023, case no. 05 O 807/22, is amended and the action dismissed. 
  33. ^ Dickinson, Sara (). „DNS Privacy Public Resolvers: DNS-over-TLS (DoT)”. DNS Privacy Project. Accesat în . 
  34. ^ Dickinson, Sara (). „DNS Privacy Public Resolvers: DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)”. DNS Privacy Project. Accesat în . 
  35. ^ Kumar, Arvind (). „DNScrypt Resolvers”. github.com. EnKrypt. Accesat în . quad9-dnscrypt-ip4-filter-pri Quad9 (anycast) dnssec/no-log/filter 9.9.9.9 / 149.112.112.9 

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Legături externe

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Adus de la https://ro.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Quad9&oldid=16513655